Dual-Donor Organ Exchange

56 Pages Posted: 24 Nov 2015 Last revised: 20 Jan 2018

See all articles by Haluk Ergin

Haluk Ergin

University of California, Berkeley

Tayfun Sonmez

Boston College - Department of Economics

M. Utku Ünver

Boston College - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 13, 2017

Abstract

Owing to the worldwide shortage of deceased-donor organs for transplantation, living donations have become a significant source of transplant organs. However, not all willing donors can donate to their intended recipients because of medical incompatibilities. These incompatibilities can be overcome by an exchange of donors between patients. For kidneys, such exchanges have become widespread in the last decade with the introduction of optimization and market design techniques to kidney exchange. A small but growing number of liver exchanges have also been conducted. Over the last two decades, a number of transplantation procedures emerged where organs from two living donors are transplanted to a single patient. Prominent examples include dual-graft liver transplantation, lobar lung transplantation, and simultaneous liver-kidney transplantation. Exchange, however, has been neither practiced nor introduced in this context. We introduce dual-donor organ exchange as a novel transplantation modality, and through simulations show that living-donor transplants can be significantly increased through such exchanges. We also provide a simple theoretical model for dual-donor organ exchange and introduce optimal exchange mechanisms under various logistical constraints.

Keywords: market design, matching, complementarities, lung exchange, dual-graft liver exchange, simultaneous liver-kidney exchange

JEL Classification: D47, C78

Suggested Citation

Ergin, Haluk and Sonmez, Tayfun Oguz and Ünver, M. Utku, Dual-Donor Organ Exchange (October 13, 2017). Econometrica, Vol. 85, No. 5, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2694911 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2694911

Haluk Ergin

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

Tayfun Oguz Sonmez

Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

M. Utku Ünver (Contact Author)

Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.bc.edu/utku-unver

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