Investment Treaties and the Internal Vetting of Regulatory Proposals: A Case Study from Canada

29 Pages Posted: 9 Dec 2015 Last revised: 19 Apr 2016

See all articles by Gus Van Harten

Gus Van Harten

York University - Osgoode Hall Law School

Dayna Nadine Scott

York University - Osgoode Hall Law School

Date Written: December 7, 2015

Abstract

In this paper, we report findings on whether trade and investment agreements that allow for investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) contribute to regulatory chill. The study focused on whether ISDS contributed to changes in internal vetting of government decisions related to environmental protection in the province of Ontario, Canada. Our main source of information was confidential interviews with insiders, mostly current or former officials in ministries with an environmental or trade mandate. We aimed to advance understanding of litigation risk and government decision-making with a focus on ISDS.

Keywords: ISDS, arbitration, regulation, regulatory chill, litigation risk, environmental protection

JEL Classification: K10

Suggested Citation

Van Harten, Gus and Scott, Dayna Nadine, Investment Treaties and the Internal Vetting of Regulatory Proposals: A Case Study from Canada (December 7, 2015). Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No. 26/2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2700238 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2700238

Gus Van Harten (Contact Author)

York University - Osgoode Hall Law School ( email )

4700 Keele Street
Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3
Canada
416 650 8419 (Phone)

Dayna Nadine Scott

York University - Osgoode Hall Law School ( email )

4700 Keele Street
Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3
Canada

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