Circumvention and Anti-Circumvention: Rising Protectionism in Australia

(2016)15(3) World Trade Review 495-522.

UNSW Law Research Paper No. 2015-81

29 Pages Posted: 14 Dec 2015 Last revised: 10 Jan 2017

See all articles by Weihuan Zhou

Weihuan Zhou

University of New South Wales (UNSW) - UNSW Law & Justice

Date Written: December 14, 2015

Abstract

The article discusses circumvention and anti-circumvention in international trade with a focus on Australia’s anti-circumvention mechanism and in particular the first anti-circumvention investigation in Australia. It identifies the major issues relating to circumvention and anti-circumvention in the GATT/WTO negotiations which have led to the failure of WTO members to conclude uniform rules on anti-circumvention. The article argues that multilateral anti-circumvention rules are necessary to standardise national anti-circumvention laws and practice and discipline unilateral use of anti-circumvention measures. The article further argues that Australia’s anti-circumvention law and practice, as reflected in its first anti-circumvention investigation, may have violated WTO rules and is likely to lead to increasing protectionism to cost of WTO members and Australia’s FTA trading partners. Australia’s unjustified use of anti-circumvention measures is unlikely to foster the development of its import-competing industries and may provoke retaliation by other countries.

Keywords: international trade, anti-circumvention mechanism, GATT, WTO, Australia, FTA

Suggested Citation

Zhou, Weihuan, Circumvention and Anti-Circumvention: Rising Protectionism in Australia (December 14, 2015). (2016)15(3) World Trade Review 495-522., UNSW Law Research Paper No. 2015-81, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2703218

Weihuan Zhou (Contact Author)

University of New South Wales (UNSW) - UNSW Law & Justice ( email )

Kensington, New South Wales 2052
Australia
+61 2 90652102 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.law.unsw.edu.au/staff/weihuan-zhou

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