Identifying Notifiable Mergers and Acquisitions for EU and Irish Merger Control Rules

Irish Business Law Review, Volume 2, Issue 2, 2015

13 Pages Posted: 21 Dec 2015 Last revised: 9 May 2017

See all articles by Conor C. Talbot

Conor C. Talbot

European University Institute, Department of Law (LAW), Alumni

Date Written: December 18, 2015

Abstract

This article highlights a series of evolving competition law risks that should be taken into account by all businesses seeking new business partners or exploring acquisition opportunities.

A number of recent developments have significantly increased the risks associated with the merger control process for businesses in Ireland and the EU.

The first section of this article outlines the recent legislative changes at the Irish level from the perspective of merging undertakings and their advisors. The second section details the sanctions applicable under Irish and EU law for a failure to notify a notifiable transaction and some other pitfalls which pose risks for merging undertakings. The third section then details some recent cases from across the EU, which indicate that this is a priority policy enforcement area for European authorities. The final section examines proposed reforms regarding the types of transactions which must be notified under the merger control rules at the EU level. The concluding remarks analyse what these developments could mean for Irish businesses and their advisors going forward.

Keywords: EU Competition Law, Ireland, Irish competition law, Merger Control

JEL Classification: K21, L4, G34

Suggested Citation

Talbot, Conor C., Identifying Notifiable Mergers and Acquisitions for EU and Irish Merger Control Rules (December 18, 2015). Irish Business Law Review, Volume 2, Issue 2, 2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2705443

Conor C. Talbot (Contact Author)

European University Institute, Department of Law (LAW), Alumni ( email )

Via Boccaccio 121 (Villa Schifanoia)
Firenze
Italy

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