Businessmen v. Investigators: Who is Responsible for the Poor Russian Investment Climate?

Russian Law Journal. 2014; 2(2):114-144

U. of Westminster School of Law Research Paper No. 16-01

32 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2015 Last revised: 12 Jan 2016

See all articles by Dmitry Gololobov

Dmitry Gololobov

University of Westminster - School of Law

Date Written: April 20, 2014

Abstract

This article aims to examine the extent to which Russian investigations into economic and financial crimes are influenced by such factors as systemic problems with Russian gatekeepers, the absence of a formal corporate whistle-blowing mechanism and the continuous abuse of the law by the Russian business community. The traditional critical approach to the quality and effectiveness of Russian economic and financial investigations does not produce positive results and needs to be reformulated by considering the opinions of entrepreneurs. The author considers that forcing Russian entrepreneurs, regardless of the size of their business, to comply with Russian laws and regulations may be a more efficient way to develop the business environment than attempting to gradually improve the Russian judicial system. It is also hardly possible to expect the Russian investigatory bodies to investigate what are effectively complex economic and financial crimes in the almost complete absence of a developed whistle-blowing culture. Such a culture has greatly contributed to the success of widely-publicised corporate and financial investigations in the United States and Europe. The poor development of the culture of Russian gatekeepers and the corresponding regulatory environment is one more significant factor that permanently undermines the effectiveness of economic investigations and damages the investment climate.

Keywords: Russia; investigation; economic crime; gatekeepers; whistleblowing

Suggested Citation

Gololobov, Dmitry, Businessmen v. Investigators: Who is Responsible for the Poor Russian Investment Climate? (April 20, 2014). Russian Law Journal. 2014; 2(2):114-144, U. of Westminster School of Law Research Paper No. 16-01, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2706237 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2706237

Dmitry Gololobov (Contact Author)

University of Westminster - School of Law ( email )

4 Little Titchfield Street
London, England W1W 7UW
United Kingdom

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