Global Environmental Agreements and Trade Sanctions

25 Pages Posted: 31 May 2001

See all articles by Josh Ederington

Josh Ederington

Miami University - Farmer School of Business

Date Written: May 2001

Abstract

Recent interest in the environment, combined with the recognition that many environmental problems have global consequences, has focused attention on global environmental agreements as a means of controlling for transboundary externalities. An important issue in the formation of these environmental agreements concerns the potential benefits of linking such agreements to international trade agreements as a means of enforcement. This paper demonstrates that strategic incentives for countries to set "weak" environmental standards lessens the need to link environmental agreements to trade agreements. However, such linkage may be beneficial when governments have a strategic incentive to impose "strong" environmental standards.

Keywords: trade agreements, environmental agreements, linkage

JEL Classification: F13, F18, H2

Suggested Citation

Ederington, Josh, Global Environmental Agreements and Trade Sanctions (May 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=270708 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.270708

Josh Ederington (Contact Author)

Miami University - Farmer School of Business ( email )

800 East High Street
Oxford, OH 45056
United States