Regulator Attitudes and the Environmental Race to the Bottom Argument

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 18(2): 321-344, 2008

38 Pages Posted: 26 Dec 2015

See all articles by David Konisky

David Konisky

Indiana University Bloomington - School of Public & Environmental Affairs (SPEA)

Date Written: July 29, 2007

Abstract

Concerns that interstate economic competition will lead states to relax their environmental regulation, potentially resulting in a race to the bottom, remain commonplace in both academic and public policy debates about state environmental policy. Most of the existing empirical work examining the race to the bottom argument tests the behavioral predictions of the argument. In this article, I focus on the attitudinal predictions. Specifically, I examine whether state regulators express beliefs consistent with what we would expect to observe if a race to the bottom dynamic operates within state regulatory decision making. Studying data from the State Environmental Managers Survey, I find that state regulators are sensitive to the effects that their regulatory decisions have on industry investment decisions and that their agencies are influenced by the regulatory decision making of economic competitor states.

Keywords: environmental policy, race to the bottom, regulation, attitudes

Suggested Citation

Konisky, David, Regulator Attitudes and the Environmental Race to the Bottom Argument (July 29, 2007). Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 18(2): 321-344, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2708142

David Konisky (Contact Author)

Indiana University Bloomington - School of Public & Environmental Affairs (SPEA) ( email )

1315 East Tenth Street
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

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