Defining Government Performance Expectations: Insights from the US and UK Financial Bailout Proposals Workgroup II: Performance in the Public Sector

35 Pages Posted: 8 Jan 2016

See all articles by Eric A. Scorsone

Eric A. Scorsone

Michigan State University - Department of Agricultural Economics

Simona Zambelli

University of Florence - Department of Business Economics

Date Written: January 1, 2009

Abstract

The economic and financial crisis of 2008 has raised some particularly challenging issues regarding assessing the performance of proposed financial institution bailout solutions. The need for quick action to avoid financial disaster often precluded a full airing of the possible advantages and disadvantages associated with the accountability and performance indicator mechanisms put in place. Now, a vigorous debate is occurring over performance indicators related to the effectiveness, efficiency and equity aspects of the solutions that have been implemented both in the U.S. and Europe. The United States major bailout proposal was the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) overseen by the Office of Financial Stability in the US Department of Treasury which has taken major ownership positions in US banks. The British bailout plan called the Bank Recapitalisation Scheme (BRS) is being directed by HM Treasury and the United Kingdom Financial institutions, Corp. which has also taken equity positions in major UK banks. These similarities and differences form the backdrop for the empirical case studies. The particular nature of these government programs make them ideal candidates for an extreme type case analysis in the characterizing the fight over defining performance. Not surprisingly, a host of academics, private financial institutions, government agencies and even intergovernmental governing bodies such as the IMF are airing their respective performance definitions. The competition between these bodies will serve as the empirical basis for assessing the arguments and motivations over how to define performance in the context of the bank bailouts. These case studies will be analyzed in the performance regime and competing values conceptual frameworks as initially brought together in Talbot (2008). The performance regime frame will help assess the institutional forces who are attempting to exert influence over indicators. The competing values frame advances the notion that there are four major types of models by which social relationships are constructed and the form through the regime influences impact indicators and performance definitions. The major new contribution presented here will be in using these case studies to define the types of variables and factors that drive different types of private and public agents in constructing the definition of performance as well as advancing this combination of the performance regime and competing values framework. It is felt that these financial bailouts provide a rich set of data upon which new insights and the advancement of knowledge can be constructed. The United States and United Kingdom models represent important cases where large scale financial bailouts have occurred in two countries that have similar business cultures and yet there remain important differences in their approaches.

Keywords: Financial crisis; Financial Markets; Financial Bailout; Public Sector

JEL Classification: E50; E58; G18

Suggested Citation

Scorsone, Eric A. and Zambelli, Simona, Defining Government Performance Expectations: Insights from the US and UK Financial Bailout Proposals Workgroup II: Performance in the Public Sector (January 1, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2712027 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2712027

Eric A. Scorsone (Contact Author)

Michigan State University - Department of Agricultural Economics ( email )

East Lansing, MI 48824
United States
+1(517)353-9460 (Phone)
+1(517)432-1800 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.aec.msu.edu/faculty/scorsone.htm

Simona Zambelli

University of Florence - Department of Business Economics ( email )

Via delle Pandette 9
Florence, Florence 50132
Italy

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