Download This PaperSocial Norms and Cooperation
6 Pages Posted: 23 Feb 2016
Date Written: February 5, 2016
Abstract
A theoretical framework is introduced to model social norms using the tools of psychological game theory. In the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, a preference for norm compliance can lead to cooperation arising with a positive probability, and if this preference is sufficiently strong, occurring as a pure strategy equilibrium. Thus, cooperation can arise as a social norm in a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma Game without repeated play, communication, or sanctions.
Keywords: cooperation, norm compliance, Prisoner's Dilemma, psychological game theory, social norm
JEL Classification: D63, Z10, D00
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
McCannon, Bryan C., Social Norms and Cooperation (February 5, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2735759 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2735759
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN
If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 212 448 2500 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.