The Political Economy of Direct Dividend Transfers in Resource-Rich Countries: A Theoretical Consideration

42 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Eoin McGuirk

Eoin McGuirk

Yale University

Anand Rajaram

World Bank; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - The International Growth Centre

Marcelo M. Giugale

World Bank; Georgetown University

Date Written: February 23, 2016

Abstract

The acceleration of natural resource discoveries across many parts of the developing world has highlighted the urgent need for solutions to the mismanagement of windfalls that has blighted many countries over the past half-century. One proposal involves distributing annually a share of resource rents to citizens in the form of direct dividend transfers. Although many scholars and policy makers have discussed the potential economic and political ramifications of the proposal from a normative perspective, few have analyzed positively the conditions under which such a policy may emerge as a politically rational choice. This policy research paper fills that gap by modeling the decision of political leaders to allocate resource revenues between cash transfers, public goods, power-preserving activities, and personal consumption. The analysis finds first that propitious political conditions, including competitive elections, undeveloped patronage networks, and a high degree of budgetary accountability, increase the share of resource revenues to be spent on citizens' welfare. The paper then shows that a high poverty headcount and inefficient public institutions will each strengthen the political incentive to provide direct dividend transfers relative to public goods. This combination of conditions is rare, which may explain why relatively few countries have implemented or plan to implement direct dividend transfers.

Keywords: Public Sector Administrative & Civil Service Reform, Access of Poor to Social Services, Government Policies, Economics and Finance of Public Institution Development, Social Analysis, Disability, Quality of Life & Leisure, Youth and Governance, Services & Transfers to Poor, Economic Assistance, Democratic Government, National Governance, Public Sector Administrative and Civil Service Reform, De Facto Governments

Suggested Citation

McGuirk, Eoin and Rajaram, Anand and Giugale, Marcelo M., The Political Economy of Direct Dividend Transfers in Resource-Rich Countries: A Theoretical Consideration (February 23, 2016). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7575, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2737186

Eoin McGuirk (Contact Author)

Yale University ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States

Anand Rajaram

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - The International Growth Centre ( email )

32 Lincoln’s Inn Fields
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Marcelo M. Giugale

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-473-7738 (Phone)
202-522-2112 (Fax)

Georgetown University ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States
2022158819 (Phone)

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