A Behavioral Model of Reciprocity in Clientelism

36 Pages Posted: 3 Mar 2016 Last revised: 21 Oct 2018

See all articles by Han Il Chang

Han Il Chang

New York University Abu Dhabi

Date Written: March 2, 2016

Abstract

I propose a formal model of reciprocity in clientelism, applying Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger's (2004) equilibrium concept, sequential reciprocity equilibrium, to an election. If voters are motivated not only by material payoffs but also by psychological payoffs resulting from engaging in the reciprocal exchange of votes for private goods, voters would vote for a politician providing private goods in a one-shot game even when the voters are strong opposers on policy grounds and the politician does not have any detection technology. The model also shows that the amount of private goods required for reciprocal voters is smaller than the amount required for purely materialistic voters. Furthermore, I modify the model in order to examine psychological channels through which norms of reciprocity intervene in the effects of poverty, social identity, voter education, compulsory voting, and post-election violence on clientelism; the modified models yield results that are broadly consistent with existing empirical studies.

Keywords: Clientelism, reciprocity, behavioral model

Suggested Citation

Chang, Han Il, A Behavioral Model of Reciprocity in Clientelism (March 2, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740903 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2740903

Han Il Chang (Contact Author)

New York University Abu Dhabi ( email )

Division of Social Science
Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates

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