Stressed to the Core: Counterparty Concentrations and Systemic Losses in CDS Markets

34 Pages Posted: 10 Mar 2016

See all articles by Jill Cetina

Jill Cetina

Government of the United States of America - Office of Financial Research

Sriram Rajan

Government of the United States of America - Office of Financial Research

Mark E. Paddrik

Government of the United States of America - Office of Financial Research

Date Written: March 8, 2016

Abstract

Supervisory stress testing to date has focused on the resiliency of large banks to withstand the direct effects of a credit shock. Using data from Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC), we apply the Federal Reserve's Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) supervisory scenarios to evaluate the default of a bank's largest counterparty. We find that indirect effects of this default, through the bank's other counterparties, are larger than the direct impact on the bank. Further, when taken as a whole, the core banking system has a higher concentration to a single counterparty than does any individual bank holding company. Under the 2015 stress, the banking system's counterparty credit concentration is high and corresponds in diversity to a market with just over three firms. Our results are the first to evaluate the credit derivatives market under stress and also underscore the importance of a macroprudential perspective on stress testing.

Keywords: Credit default swaps, stress testing, systemic risk, financial networks, counterparty exposure, contagion

JEL Classification: D85, G01, G13, G20, L14

Suggested Citation

Cetina, Jill and Rajan, Sriram and Paddrik, Mark Endel, Stressed to the Core: Counterparty Concentrations and Systemic Losses in CDS Markets (March 8, 2016). OFR WP 16-01, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2744949 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2744949

Jill Cetina (Contact Author)

Government of the United States of America - Office of Financial Research ( email )

717 14th Street, NW
Washington DC, DC 20005
United States

Sriram Rajan

Government of the United States of America - Office of Financial Research ( email )

717 14th Street, NW
Washington DC, DC 20005
United States

Mark Endel Paddrik

Government of the United States of America - Office of Financial Research ( email )

717 14th Street, NW
Washington DC, DC 20005
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
110
Abstract Views
1,058
Rank
451,552
PlumX Metrics