Competition Authorities: Prosecutorial/Non-Prosecutorial Systems and the Fight Against Cartels

Abstract

In recent years, considerable attention has been paid to the structures of different governmental institutions and the impact of such institutional structure on the outcomes and efficacy of goal attainment. At the same time, there is a global trend to impose criminal sanctions (i.e. imprisonment, fines, seizure of personal property, etc.) on people found to be engaging in cartelization. This paper focuses on institutional design and examines its impact regulation of cartels by way of criminalization of cartelists. The paper summarizes and describes what the main institutional characteristics of competition authorities are and unveils the international trends with regards to decision-making functions and the criminalization of cartelist. The paper then details the interaction and implications of decision-making function and criminalization of the cartels.

Keywords: Competition Policy, Institutional Design, Prosecutorial, Cartels, Non Prosecutorial