Immunity to Credible Deviations from the Truth

19 Pages Posted: 6 Apr 2016 Last revised: 8 Apr 2016

See all articles by Salvador Barberà

Salvador Barberà

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; MOVE; Barcelona School of Economics

Dolors Berga-Colom

University of Girona - Department of Economics

Bernardo Moreno

University of Malaga

Date Written: April 4, 2016

Abstract

We introduce a new notion of non-manipulability by groups, based on the idea that some of the agreements among a set of potential manipulators may be credible, while others may not. The derived notion of immunity to credible manipulations by groups is intermediate between individual and group strategy-proofness. We show that our new concept has bite, by applying it to the analysis of a large family of public good decision problems in separable environments, where there exist many attractive strategy-proof rules that are, however, manipulable by groups. In these environments we show that some of these rules are indeed, immune to credible group manipulations, while others are not. We provide characterization results that separate these two classes.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness, Group strategy-proofness, Credibility, Implementation, Voting

JEL Classification: D71

Suggested Citation

Barberà, Salvador and Berga-Colom, Dolors and Moreno, Bernardo, Immunity to Credible Deviations from the Truth (April 4, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2758758 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2758758

Salvador Barberà (Contact Author)

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona ( email )

Edifici B - Campus Bellaterra
Cerdanyola del Vallès, Barcelolna 08193
Spain
34935811814 (Phone)
34935812012 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://pareto.uab.es/sbarbera/

MOVE ( email )

Campus de Bellaterra-UAB Edifici B (s/n)
EDIFICI B
Cerdanyola del Vallès
, Barcelona 08193
Spain
34935812188 (Phone)
34935812012 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.movebarcelona.eu/

Barcelona School of Economics ( email )

Carrer de Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://bse.eu/

Dolors Berga-Colom

University of Girona - Department of Economics ( email )

Campus de Montilivi s/n
Girona, Girona 17071
Spain

Bernardo Moreno

University of Malaga ( email )

Malaga, Málaga 29004
Spain

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