The Effects of Financial and Recognition Incentives Across Work Contexts: The Role of Meaning

34 Pages Posted: 18 Apr 2016

See all articles by Michael Kosfeld

Michael Kosfeld

Goethe University Frankfurt; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); University of Bonn - Center for Development Research (ZEF)

Susanne Neckermann

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

Xiaolan Yang

Zhejiang University

Date Written: April 2016

Abstract

We manipulate workers' perceived meaning of a job in a field experiment and interact meaning of work with both financial and recognition incentives. Results show that workers exert more effort when meaning is high. Money has a positive effect on performance that is independent of meaning. In contrast, meaning and recognition interact negatively. Our results provide new insights into the stability of incentive effects across important work contexts. They also suggest that meaning and worker recognition may operate via the same motivational channel.

Keywords: context factors, field experiment, interactions, meaning, monetary incentives, worker recognition

JEL Classification: C93, J33, M12, M52

Suggested Citation

Kosfeld, Michael and Neckermann, Susanne and Yang, Xiaolan, The Effects of Financial and Recognition Incentives Across Work Contexts: The Role of Meaning (April 2016). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11221, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2766549

Michael Kosfeld (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 4
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 7 / 9
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

University of Bonn - Center for Development Research (ZEF) ( email )

Walter-Flex-Str. 3
Bonn, NRW 53113
Germany

Susanne Neckermann

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )

Xiaolan Yang

Zhejiang University ( email )

38 Zheda Road
Hangzhou, Zhejiang 310058
China

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