Governance of Telecommunications Markets – The Case of International Mobile Roaming
Competition and Regulation in Network Industries (CRNI), Brussels, 25 November 2012
17 Pages Posted: 31 Dec 2018
Date Written: November 25, 2011
Abstract
The problem of international mobile roaming (IMR) was defined in 1999 ‒ prices that were far in excess of costs and were seemingly immune from the competitive forces that might be expected to drive them down. The case is complicated by retail and wholesale markets being in different countries and jurisdictions, with complex patterns of imbalances in traffic between operators. The issue has been examined by all the European institutions plus several countries and inter-governmental bodies. These inquiries allow an examination of how national and intergovernmental systems of governance for telecommunication markets have responded to the challenges of the surprisingly complex economic relations for a service that is technically relatively simple. A major challenge is to explain a sequence of errors of judgement, despite the availability of considerable resources.
The failure to develop a robust economic model of IMR markets remains an enduring problem, there is not even an accepted market definition for competition law purposes There have been some limited analyses of inter-operator alliances, of multiple numbers on one phone and of Zain, but these lack real data on levels of use and profitability. There have been no analyses of the failure of innovative solutions from software houses that the operators seem to have rejected.
Twelve years after the original complaint it is still not possible to say with confidence if there is a market failure and, if so, what it might be. While the IMR saga has a few heroes and heroines, the monster may yet prove to have been illusory.
Keywords: telecommunications, governance, wireless, networks, roaming, international mobile roaming, Europe, European Union
JEL Classification: K21, K23, K29, F53, F60
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation