Bond Market Intermediation and the Role of Repo

50 Pages Posted: 2 May 2016 Last revised: 22 Oct 2018

See all articles by Yesol Huh

Yesol Huh

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Sebastian Infante

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 20, 2018

Abstract

We model the role that repos play in bond market intermediation. Not only do repos allow dealers to finance their activities, but also enable dealers to source assets without taking ownership. When the asset trades with repo specialness, borrowing the asset is more expensive, resulting in higher bid-ask spreads. Limiting a single dealer's leverage decreases its market-making abilities and increases its bid-ask spread. However, limiting all dealers' leverage reduces pressure on repo specialness, thus decreasing bid-ask spreads. More generally, the model gives insights into how frictions in repo markets can affect the underlying cash market liquidity.

Keywords: Market Liquidity, Treasury Market, Repo, Intermediation

JEL Classification: G2, G24, G28

Suggested Citation

Huh, Yesol and Infante, Sebastian, Bond Market Intermediation and the Role of Repo (October 20, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2773678 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2773678

Yesol Huh

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/yesolhuh

Sebastian Infante (Contact Author)

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/sebinfante/home

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