Supplement to 'Subjective Dynamic Information Constraints'

34 Pages Posted: 4 May 2016

See all articles by David Dillenberger

David Dillenberger

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

R. Vijay Krishna

Florida State University - Department of Economics

Philipp Sadowski

Duke University - Department of Economics

Date Written: April 1, 2016

Abstract

Supplement to "Subjective Dynamic Information Constraints" (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2774300). All references to definitions and results in this Supplement refer to Dillenberger, Krishna, and Sadowski (2016, henceforth DKS) unless otherwise specified. This supplement is organized as follows. Section 1 establishes the Abstract Static Representation that is the starting point for our derivations in Appendix C of DKS. Section 2 reviews relevant notions from convex analysis. Section 3 provides a preference independent notion of minimality on the space of rics, which is referred to in Section 6 of DKS. Section 4 provides a metric on the space of partitions as referred to in Appendix A.3 of DKS. Section 5 extends the existence of the RAA representation, which is established in Krishna and Sadowski (2014) for finite prize spaces, to our domain with a compact set of prizes, as discussed in Appendix A.7 of DKS. Finally, Section 6 provides a detailed proof of the partitional representation introduced in Appendix C.1 of DKS.

Suggested Citation

Dillenberger, David and Krishna, R. Vijay and Sadowski, Philipp, Supplement to 'Subjective Dynamic Information Constraints' (April 1, 2016). Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper No. 215, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2774306

David Dillenberger

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-1503 (Phone)

R. Vijay Krishna

Florida State University - Department of Economics ( email )

Tallahassee, FL 30306-2180
United States

Philipp Sadowski (Contact Author)

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

213 Social Sciences Building
Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States
919-660-1800 (Phone)

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