Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law

Abstract

When Legislators award amnesties to ‘low-rank’ criminals cooperating with the justice, top criminals may capture public officials to avoid being sanctioned. Optimal policies should anticipate this danger and fight it back by granting amnesties not only to low-rank criminals, but also to officials who plea guilty and report bribe givers. Even if the threat of being betrayed by their fellows may induce top-criminals to bribe prosecutors, these policies increase the conviction risk not only for top-criminals but also for low-rank ones, whereby increasing the risk premium that they require to participate in the crime. This domino effect can deter crime more than a policy based only on amnesties to low-rank criminals would: the bright side of subversion of law.

Keywords: Criminal Organizations, Corruption, Leniency

JEL Classification: K14, K42, D73, D78