Do Financial Incentives Influence Gps' Decisions to Do After-Hours Work? A Discrete Choice Labour Supply Model

35 Pages Posted: 9 May 2016

See all articles by Barbara Broadway

Barbara Broadway

University of Melbourne - Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research; ARC Centre of Excellence for Children and Families over the Life Course

Guyonne R.J. Kalb

University of Melbourne - Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research; ARC Centre of Excellence for Children and Families over the Life Course; IZA

Jinhu Li

University of Melbourne - Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research; University of Melbourne - ARC Centre of Excellence for Children and Families over the Life Course

Anthony Scott

University of Melbourne - Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research

Abstract

This paper analyses doctors' supply of after-hours care, and how it is affected by personal and family circumstances as well as the earnings structure. We use detailed survey data from a large sample of Australian General Practitioners to estimate a structural, discrete-choice model of labour supply and after-hours care. This allows us to jointly model how many daytime-weekday hours a doctor works, and his or her probability of providing after-hours care. The underlying utility function varies across individual and family characteristics. We simulate labour supply responses to an increase in doctors' hourly earnings, both in a daytime-weekday setting and for after-hours care.Among doctors overall, men and women increase their daytime-weekday working hours if their hourly earnings in this setting increases, but only to a very small extent. Men's labour supply elasticities do not change if their family circumstances change, but for women the small behavioural response disappears completely if they have preschool-aged children. Doctors are somewhat more likely to provide after-hours care if their hourly earnings in that setting increases, but again the effect is very small and is only evident in some sub-groups. Moreover, higher earnings in weekday-daytime practice reduces the probability of providing after-hours care, particularly for men. Increasing doctors' earnings appears to be at best relatively ineffective in encouraging increased provision of after-hours care, and may even prove harmful if incentives are not well-targeted.

Keywords: labour supply, after-hours care, wage elasticity, health workforce, MABEL

JEL Classification: I11, J22, J44, J21

Suggested Citation

Broadway, Barbara and Kalb, Guyonne R.J. and Li, Jinhu and Scott, Anthony, Do Financial Incentives Influence Gps' Decisions to Do After-Hours Work? A Discrete Choice Labour Supply Model. IZA Discussion Paper No. 9910, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2776915 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2776915

Barbara Broadway (Contact Author)

University of Melbourne - Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research ( email )

Level 5, FBE Building, 111 Barry Street
Parkville, Victoria 3010
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://www.melbourneinstitute.com/

ARC Centre of Excellence for Children and Families over the Life Course ( email )

Guyonne R.J. Kalb

University of Melbourne - Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research ( email )

Level 5, FBE Building, 111 Barry Street
Parkville, Victoria 3010
Australia

ARC Centre of Excellence for Children and Families over the Life Course ( email )

185 Pelham Street
Carlton, 3053
Australia

IZA ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Jinhu Li

University of Melbourne - Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research ( email )

5th Floor, FBE building
111 Barry Street
Carlton, VIC 3053
Australia
+61 3 90353753 (Phone)

University of Melbourne - ARC Centre of Excellence for Children and Families over the Life Course ( email )

Anthony Scott

University of Melbourne - Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research ( email )

Level 5, FBE Building, 111 Barry Street
Parkville, Victoria 3010
Australia

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