Religious Seduction in Autocracy: A Theory Inspired by History

73 Pages Posted: 9 May 2016

See all articles by Emmanuelle Auriol

Emmanuelle Auriol

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE); University of Toulouse I - Advanced Research in Quantitative Applied Development Economics (ARQADE); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Jean-Philippe Platteau

Member of CRED (Centre de Recherche en Economie du Developpement) at the University of Namur, Belgium

Date Written: May 2016

Abstract

The relationship between religion and politics is explored from a theoretical standpoint, assuming that religious clerics can be seduced by the ruler acting as an autocrat. The comparative effects of decentralized versus centralized religions on the optimal level of cooperation between the autocrat and the religious clerics, which itself impinges upon political stability, is analysed. The paper shows that the presence of a decentralized body of clerics makes autocratic regimes more unstable. It also shows that in time of stability, the level of reforms is larger with a centralized religion than with a decentralized one. When the autocrat in the decentralized case pushes more reforms than in the centralized one, he always does so at the cost of stability. Historical case studies are presented that serve to illustrate the main results.

Keywords: Autocracy, centralized and decentralized religion, economic development, instrumentalization of religion, Islam, reforms

JEL Classification: D02, D72, N40, O57, P48, Z12

Suggested Citation

Auriol, Emmanuelle and Platteau, Jean-Philippe, Religious Seduction in Autocracy: A Theory Inspired by History (May 2016). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11258, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2777545

Emmanuelle Auriol (Contact Author)

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

University of Toulouse I - Advanced Research in Quantitative Applied Development Economics (ARQADE) ( email )

21 Allee de Brienne
Toulouse, 31000
France
+33 5 61 12 85 89 (Phone)
+33 5 61 12 86 37 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.idei.asso.fr/English/ECv/CvChercheurs/E

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Jean-Philippe Platteau

Member of CRED (Centre de Recherche en Economie du Developpement) at the University of Namur, Belgium

8 Rempart de la Vierge
Namur
Belgium

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