Shareholder Perks in Japan: Price Movement and Trading Volume Around Ex-Benefit Days

38 Pages Posted: 9 May 2016

See all articles by Wei Huang

Wei Huang

University of Hawaii at Manoa - Shidler College of Business

S. Ghon Rhee

University of Hawaii at Manoa - Shidler College of Business; University of Hawaii at Manoa - Department of Financial Economics and Institutions

Katsushi Suzuki

Hitotsubashi University - Graduate School of International Corporate Strategy

Taeko Yasutake

Soka University

Date Written: May 9, 2016

Abstract

This study examines the valuation of shareholder perks in Japan known as kabunushi yutai, which are noncash gifts and services that shareholders receive. This article reveals that the prices of stocks with shareholder perks drop on ex-benefit days, after controlling for cash dividends and other underlying factors, and excessive trade volume is observed around ex-dividend days. Price and volume movements for stocks with shareholder perks suggest the existence of a clientele of investors who value noncash forms of payout.

Suggested Citation

Huang, Wei and Rhee, S. Ghon and Suzuki, Katsushi and Yasutake, Taeko, Shareholder Perks in Japan: Price Movement and Trading Volume Around Ex-Benefit Days (May 9, 2016). Asian Finance Association (AsianFA) 2016 Conference, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2777549 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2777549

Wei Huang

University of Hawaii at Manoa - Shidler College of Business ( email )

2404 Maile Way
Honolulu, HI 96822
United States
808-956-7679 (Phone)
808-956-9887 (Fax)

S. Ghon Rhee

University of Hawaii at Manoa - Shidler College of Business ( email )

2404 Maile Way
C-304, FEI/CBA
Honolulu, HI 96822
United States

University of Hawaii at Manoa - Department of Financial Economics and Institutions ( email )

United States

Katsushi Suzuki

Hitotsubashi University - Graduate School of International Corporate Strategy ( email )

2-1-2 Hitotsubashi
Chiyoda-ku,
Tokyo, 101-8439
Japan

Taeko Yasutake (Contact Author)

Soka University ( email )

Tokyo, 192-8577
Japan

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