A Competitive Theory of Monopoly Unionism

67 Pages Posted: 9 Sep 2001 Last revised: 4 Nov 2022

See all articles by Edward P. Lazear

Edward P. Lazear

Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: May 1981

Abstract

This paper sets up a microeconomic theory of labor unions. It discusses their formation and goals, their hierarchical structure, and the nature of rent distribution. The theory provides predictions for the probability that an industry or occupation will be unionized, the proportion of that industry that will be unionized, and observed wage differentials within that industry. It discusses the way that those values change in response to changes in the supply of labor, demand for labor, cost of organizing the union, and cost of defeating the union. Institutions such as featherbedding, fringe benefits, and seniority are rationalized in this framework. The model is consistent with competitive factor and product markets.

Suggested Citation

Lazear, Edward P., A Competitive Theory of Monopoly Unionism (May 1981). NBER Working Paper No. w0672, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=278024

Edward P. Lazear (Contact Author)

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