Incentives and Teacher Effort: Further Evidence from a Developing Country

Economics of Transition, Forthcoming

47 Pages Posted: 22 May 2016 Last revised: 27 May 2016

See all articles by Hai-Anh Dang

Hai-Anh Dang

World Bank - Development Data Group (DECDG); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Indiana University Bloomington - School of Public & Environmental Affairs (SPEA); Global Labor Organization (GLO); Vietnam National University Ha Noi

Elizabeth King

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 3, 2016

Abstract

Few would contest that teachers are a very important determinant of whether students learn in school and how to improve teacher performance has been the focus of much policy debate in rich and poor countries. This paper examines how incentives, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary, correlate with teacher effort. Using school survey data from Lao PDR, we estimate new measures of teacher effort including the number of hours that teachers spend preparing for classes and teacher provision of private tutoring classes outside of class hours. Estimation results are consistent with the standard labor supply framework and indicate that higher teacher effort is associated with non-pecuniary incentives such as greater teacher autonomy over teaching materials, and monitoring mechanism such as the existence of an active parent-teacher association and ability of school principals to dismiss teachers. Methodologically, this paper provides a detailed derivation of a simultaneous OLS-probit model with school random effects that can jointly estimate teacher work hours and tutoring provision.

Keywords: teacher incentives, teacher effort, private tutoring, joint probit-OLS, school random effects, Lao PDR

JEL Classification: I21, O15, C30

Suggested Citation

Dang, Hai-Anh H. and King, Elizabeth, Incentives and Teacher Effort: Further Evidence from a Developing Country (May 3, 2016). Economics of Transition, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2782481

Hai-Anh H. Dang (Contact Author)

World Bank - Development Data Group (DECDG) ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/haianhhdang/

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

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Germany

Indiana University Bloomington - School of Public & Environmental Affairs (SPEA) ( email )

1315 East Tenth Street
Bloomington, IN 47405
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Global Labor Organization (GLO) ( email )

Collogne
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Vietnam National University Ha Noi ( email )

Elizabeth King

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States

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