Hidden Persuaders: Do Small Gifts Lubricate Business Negotiations?

23 Pages Posted: 9 Jun 2016

See all articles by Michel André Maréchal

Michel André Maréchal

University of Zurich - Department of Economics

Christian Thöni

University of Lausanne

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2016

Abstract

Gift-giving customs are ubiquitous in social, political, and business life. Legal regulation and industry guidelines for gifts are often based on the assumption that large gifts have the potential to influence behavior and create conflicts of interest, but small gifts do not. However, scientific evidence on the impact of small gifts on business relationships is scarce. We conducted a controlled field experiment in collaboration with sales agents of a multinational consumer products company to study the influence of small gifts on the outcome of business negotiations. We find that small gifts matter. On average, sales representatives generate more than twice as much revenue when they distribute a small gift at the onset of their negotiations. However, we also find that small gifts tend to be counterproductive when purchasing and sales agents meet for the first time, underlining that the nature of the business relationship crucially affects the profitability of gifts.

Keywords: reciprocity, gift exchange, field experiment, negotiations

JEL Classification: D630, C930

Suggested Citation

Maréchal, Michel André and Thöni, Christian, Hidden Persuaders: Do Small Gifts Lubricate Business Negotiations? (April 2016). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5888, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2791976 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2791976

Michel André Maréchal (Contact Author)

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Zuerich, 8006
Switzerland

Christian Thöni

University of Lausanne ( email )

Quartier Chambronne
Lausanne, Vaud CH-1015
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://people.unil.ch/christianthoeni/

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