A Supranational Regime that Nationalizes Social Conflict. Explaining European Trade Unions’ Difficulties in Politicizing European Economic Governance

Labor History, Volume 56, Issue 3, [Special Issue: Politicizing the Transnational]

Posted: 17 Jun 2016

See all articles by Roland Erne

Roland Erne

University College Dublin, School of Business

Date Written: 2015

Abstract

Until very recently, European employers and political leaders denied the need for any coordination in industrial relations at EU level. In 2011 however, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a new European economic governance regime that makes EU member states’ labor policies subject to multilateral surveillance procedures. This paper analyzes this ‘silent revolution’ from above and assesses organized labor’s responses to this challenge. It shows that the EU’s new governance regime does not follow the classical model of a federal state, but rather the governance structures of multinational corporations that control their local subsidiaries through the use of whipsawing tactics and coercive comparisons. European trade unions’ and social movements’ difficulties in politicizing European economic governance are thus best explained by the ability of the new supranational EU regime to nationalize social conflicts.

Keywords: Euro crisis, European economic governance, Six-Pack, bargaining coordination, wage bargaining, trade unions, collective action, politicization

Suggested Citation

Erne, Roland, A Supranational Regime that Nationalizes Social Conflict. Explaining European Trade Unions’ Difficulties in Politicizing European Economic Governance (2015). Labor History, Volume 56, Issue 3, [Special Issue: Politicizing the Transnational], Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2792553

Roland Erne (Contact Author)

University College Dublin, School of Business ( email )

Belfield
Belfield, Dublin 4 4
Ireland

HOME PAGE: http://www.ucd.ie/indrel/staff/rolanderne/

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