Efficient Auction Mechanisms with Interdependent Valuations and Multidimensional Signals
37 Pages Posted: 15 Aug 2001
Date Written: August 7, 2001
Abstract
We develop an auction model for the case of interdependent values and multidimensional signals in which agents' information is not independent. We show that a modification of the Vickrey auction which includes payments to the bidders will result in an efficient outcome under very good general conditions. Further, we provide a definition of informational size such that the necessary payments to bidders will be arbitrarily small if agents are sufficiently informationally small.
Keywords: Auctions, Incentive Compatibility, Mechanism Design, Interdependent Values
JEL Classification: C70, D44, D60, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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