The Political Economy of Public Sector Absence: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan

82 Pages Posted: 13 Jun 2016

See all articles by Michael Callen

Michael Callen

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Saad Gulzar

Stanford University - Department of Political Science

Syed Ali Hasanain

Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS); University of Oxford

Muhammad Yasir Khan

University of Pittsburgh

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2016

Abstract

This paper presents evidence that one cause of absenteeism in the public sector is that government jobs are handed out as patronage. First, politicians routinely interfere when bureaucrats sanction absent doctors, and doctors are more absent in uncompetitive constituencies and when connected to politicians. Next, we find that the effects of two experimental interventions to address absence are attenuated in uncompetitive constituencies and for connected doctors. The first is a smartphone monitoring technology that nearly doubles inspection rates, and the second, representing the first experiment on the effects of providing data to policymakers, channels real time information on doctor absence.

Keywords: Absence, Corruption, Data in Policymaking, Information Communication Technology, patronage, Political Competition, Political Connections

JEL Classification: D72, D73

Suggested Citation

Callen, Michael and Gulzar, Saad and Hasanain, Syed Ali and Khan, Muhammad, The Political Economy of Public Sector Absence: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan (June 2016). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11321, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2795084

Michael Callen (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Saad Gulzar

Stanford University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Syed Ali Hasanain

Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) ( email )

D.H.A, Lahore Cantt
Lahore, Punjab 54792
Pakistan

University of Oxford

Mansfield Road
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX1 4AU
United Kingdom

Muhammad Khan

University of Pittsburgh ( email )

4901 Wesley Posvar Hall
230 South Bouquet Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States

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