Salience Games: Keeping Environmental Issues in (and out) of the Public Eye

31 Pages Posted: 17 Jun 2016

See all articles by Anthony Heyes

Anthony Heyes

University of Ottawa - Department of Economics

Thomas P. Lyon

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Steve Martin

University of Ottawa - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 2016

Abstract

Businesses and green activists seek to influence public attention to the social impacts of a sector — they play salience games. An activist allocates funds between campaigning against a polluting industry and other environmental projects. When public attention is scarce, a greater campaign orientation induces industry to invest more heavily in symbolic action that cloaks damage and reduces the risk of salience. This makes fundraising more challenging for the activist, diminishing funds available for both campaign and non-campaign activities. The activist strategically biases its mission away from campaigns — and in favor of broad versus narrow campaigns — but not by as much as a welfare-motivated planner would wish. When salience is avoided by a mixture of symbolic and substantive action, a greater weight on the latter induces the NGO to become more campaign-oriented, with environmental damage lower and welfare higher. Concentrated industries prefer symbolic action, and un-concentrated industries prefer substantive action.

Keywords: Non-Market Strategy, NGOs, Salience

JEL Classification: L31, D83, M14

Suggested Citation

Heyes, Anthony and Lyon, Thomas P. and Martin, Steve, Salience Games: Keeping Environmental Issues in (and out) of the Public Eye (June 2016). Ross School of Business Paper No. 1318, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2796047 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2796047

Anthony Heyes (Contact Author)

University of Ottawa - Department of Economics ( email )

Social Sciences Building Room 9005
Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6N5
Canada

Thomas P. Lyon

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States
734-615-1639 (Phone)

Steve Martin

University of Ottawa - Department of Economics ( email )

120 University pvt.
Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6N5
Canada

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