Regulating the Inferential Process in Alleged Art 101 TFEU Infringements

Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Volume 13, Issue 1, 1 March 2017, Pages 45–88

40 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2016 Last revised: 2 Dec 2019

See all articles by Kenneth Khoo

Kenneth Khoo

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Faculty of Law; Harvard Law School

Date Written: July 12, 2016

Abstract

EU Competition Law has various evidentiary rules and presumptions relating to the existence of collusive activity. We consider the effect of these rules and presumptions on economic efficiency, and highlight two forms of inefficiency associated with existing adjectival law. Firstly, both under and over regulation of the inferential process introduce error costs flowing from erroneous inferences. Due to the inherent nature of collusive activity, cases involving Competition Law are likely to invite a particular type of erroneous inference – the inference of collusive activity from the parallel conduct of firms. Secondly, we illustrate a different type of inefficiency that arises in Competition Law. Since evidential rules and presumptions have the potential to influence the behaviour of firms in a collusive setting, the over-regulation of the inferential process has the potential to ameliorate the sustainability of a collusive equilibrium, undermining a key rationale of substantive Competition Law. We set out three specific areas of adjectival law which exhibit these forms of inefficiency, and argue for appropriate reformation of the law.

Keywords: Competition Law, Law and Economics, Evidence, Procedure

Suggested Citation

Khoo, Kenneth, Regulating the Inferential Process in Alleged Art 101 TFEU Infringements (July 12, 2016). Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Volume 13, Issue 1, 1 March 2017, Pages 45–88, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808824 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2808824

Kenneth Khoo (Contact Author)

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Faculty of Law ( email )

469G Bukit Timah Road
Eu Tong Sen Building
Singapore, 259776
Singapore

Harvard Law School ( email )

1563 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
118
Abstract Views
977
Rank
425,167
PlumX Metrics