The Provision of Non-Audit Services by Accounting Firms to Their Audit Clients

Posted: 4 Dec 1996

See all articles by Michael Firth

Michael Firth

Lingnan University - Department of Finance and Insurance

Abstract

There has been a strong growth in accounting firms' provisions of non-audit services to their audit clients. To date, however, there have been few studies into the determinants of this joint provision of audit and non-audit services. One reason for the paucity of research is the lack of publicly available data with which to empirically examine relationships and test theories. However, recent legislation in the United Kingdom requires disclosure of non-audit fees paid to a company's auditor and this provides data with which to investigate the joint provision of consultancy and audit services. A model is developed that seeks to explain a company's decision to hire non-audit services from the auditor. The model argues that companies that face potentially high agency costs purchase relatively smaller amounts of non-audit services from their auditor. High agency cost companies require independent audits in order to reassure investors and creditors; the provision of joint services, which increases the economic bonding of the auditor to the client, may jeopardize independence or the appearance of independence. The model is tested using data observations from 500 companies and the results indicate that companies that have higher agency costs proxies are associated with smaller purchases of non-audit services from their auditors.

JEL Classification: M40, M49

Suggested Citation

Firth, Michael, The Provision of Non-Audit Services by Accounting Firms to Their Audit Clients. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2826

Michael Firth (Contact Author)

Lingnan University - Department of Finance and Insurance ( email )

Castle Peak Road
Tuen Mun, New Territories
Hong Kong
China
+852 2616 8160 (Phone)
+852 2466 4751 (Fax)

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