Preferences for International Redistribution in the United States: Self-Interest or World Views?
38 Pages Posted: 20 Sep 2016
Date Written: July 25, 2016
Abstract
This research note studies variation in mass support for international redistribution in the United States. While programs like foreign aid have impacts on individuals’ material well-being through both tax and transfer mechanisms and terms of trade effects, these effects are often contradictory and ambiguous. Accordingly, I argue that individuals use partisan cues, ideologies, and structuring world-views as heuristics to arrive at opinions on policies that transfer resources abroad. I test these theoretical expectations using an original, nationally representative survey that examines stated and revealed preferences for foreign aid, cuts in agricultural tariffs and subsidies, and charitable giving. Proxies for self-interest such as income and employment status are poor predictors of mass attitudes, while individuals’ partisanship, ideology, and altruistic and cosmopolitan dispositions are more strongly and consistently correlated with individuals’ preferences. These findings buttress existing research that emphasizes the sociotropic foundations of mass opinion on international political economy questions (Mansfield and Mutz, 2009; Bechtel et al., 2014) and point to the importance of organized interests and elites in explaining patterns of Congressional voting that are consistent with Stolper-Samuelson models (Milner and Tingley, 2010, 2011).
Keywords: Redistribution, Foreign Aid, Trade, Preferences, United States
JEL Classification: D31, D64, F35, F50
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation