Fracking Oligarchies: Environmental and Social Disasters Caused by Hydraulic Fracturing Explained by the Rule of the Few

31 Pages Posted: 4 Oct 2016

Date Written: October 3, 2013

Abstract

This paper will propose that the extraction of gas by hydraulic fracturing, and the social and environmental disasters that shadow it, can be best explained by the influence exerted by a select few extremely wealthy people in order to secure their private interests: to protect and further embed their wealth and power. Oligarchs in the United States form an exceptionally small proportion of the total population, but control a vast amount of the financial resources. These financial resources allow the oligarchs access to high-ranking government officials, but those same resources can also be used to influence political decision-making through 'think tanks', contributions to political campaigns or by employing the services of professional lobby agents. This paper will first, though briefly, examine the contemporary energy crisis caused by the depletion of finite natural resources. Then it will look into the history and process of hydraulic fracturing, before turning to the environmental impacts, with a particular focus on the local communities and the social impacts.

Keywords: Hydraulic Fracturing, Fracking, Tragedy of the Commons, Oligarchies, Inequality, United States, Fossil Fuel, Peak Oil, Environmental Politics, Hardin, Energy Crisis

JEL Classification: A13, D63, L72, P28

Suggested Citation

Blokker, Vincent, Fracking Oligarchies: Environmental and Social Disasters Caused by Hydraulic Fracturing Explained by the Rule of the Few (October 3, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2846840 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2846840

Vincent Blokker (Contact Author)

University of New England ( email )

School of Humanities
Building E21 Room 165
Armidale, NSW 2351
Australia
+61267733799 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.une.edu.au

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