Fiduciary Accountability for Public Service Opportunism

Abstract

The rule we apply to those who undertake to serve others is that they not exploit for selective gain the access they acquire directly or incidentally to the assets of their beneficiaries. That regulation is widely intuitively understood, but not cleanly articulated in the public service jurisprudence. There appears to be uncertainty as to whether a democratic state per se is a status fiduciary, whether citizens are fiduciaries in their voting capacities, whether political representatives are fiduciaries to the state or to their constituents, whether representatives who are members of political parties are conflicted and whether political parties may be accountable as fiduciaries. Starting with the underlying political theory, I apply conventional principle to these and other matters. I show that the state has no status fiduciary duty to anyone, but that citizens, representatives and political parties are subject to status and fact-based accountability.

Keywords: Fiduciary Accountability, Public Service Accountability, Political Accountability, Political Corruption, Political Opportunism, Authority Unit