Securities Lending as Wholesale Funding: Evidence from the U.S. Life Insurance Industry

40 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2016 Last revised: 25 Mar 2023

See all articles by Nathan Foley-Fisher

Nathan Foley-Fisher

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Borghan Narajabad

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Stephane Verani

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2016

Abstract

The existing literature assumes that securities lenders primarily respond to demand from securities borrowers and reinvest their cash collateral in short-term markets. We offer compelling evidence for a supply channel, using new data matching U.S. life insurers' individual bond lending and reinvestment decisions to the universe of securities lending transactions. We show that an insurer's decision to lend a bond is positively correlated with liquidity transformation in its lending program, even after controlling for demand for that bond. We discuss how using securities lending cash collateral as a source of wholesale funding might impair securities markets in times of stress.

Suggested Citation

Foley-Fisher, Nathan and Narajabad, Borghan and Verani, Stephane, Securities Lending as Wholesale Funding: Evidence from the U.S. Life Insurance Industry (October 2016). NBER Working Paper No. w22774, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2861706

Nathan Foley-Fisher (Contact Author)

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

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Washington, DC 20551
United States

Borghan Narajabad

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

Stephane Verani

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/stephane-verani.htm

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