Regulatory Autonomy Constraints from GATS’ Unconditional Obligations: The Case of the European Union

KU Leuven - Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, Working Paper No. 132, March 2014

66 Pages Posted: 10 Nov 2016

See all articles by Bregt Natens

Bregt Natens

KU Leuven - Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies

Jan Wouters

KU Leuven - Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 10, 2014

Abstract

In this report, the inherent tension between regulatory autonomy and trade liberalisation is addressed with a focus on trade in services. Therefore, this report examines in detail what is meant by the term ‘(constraints on) regulatory autonomy’ in trade law literature and develops five dimensions of the term:

(i) endogenous and exogenous regulatory autonomy,

(ii) regulatory autonomy related to the interest which a measure aims to advance,

(iii) macro level constraints stemming from trade agreements,

(iv) regulatory autonomy concerns resulting from the three steps of establishing a trade law violation, and

(v) constraints related to the nature of the obligation.

Subsequently, this report addresses how, in the case of the European Union, GATS’ unconditional obligations constrain regulatory autonomy. Aside from the Most-Favoured-Nation obligation, we address a series of obligations related to transparency. Our preliminary conclusions reflect the partial nature of this report, but already highlight that these unconditional obligations contain a few possibly problematic constraints on regulatory autonomy.

Keywords: WTO, World Trade Organization, GATS, General Agreement on Trade in Services, services

Suggested Citation

Natens, Bregt and Wouters, Jan, Regulatory Autonomy Constraints from GATS’ Unconditional Obligations: The Case of the European Union (March 10, 2014). KU Leuven - Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, Working Paper No. 132, March 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2867385 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2867385

Bregt Natens

KU Leuven - Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies ( email )

Charles Deberiotstraat 34
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Jan Wouters (Contact Author)

KU Leuven - Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies ( email )

House De Dorlodot - Deberiotstraat 34
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.globalgovernancestudies.eu

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