Robust implementation with peer mechanisms and evidence

57 Pages Posted: 23 Nov 2016 Last revised: 29 Nov 2023

See all articles by Leonie Baumann

Leonie Baumann

McGill University - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 24, 2023

Abstract

A principal must allocate a prize without monetary transfers. She wants to give it to the highest value agent. Agents know their own and their neighbors’ values, as determined by a network. Competing for the prize, agents send messages about themselves (applications) and their neighbors (references). They face a limit to lying, so information is partially verifiable. No incentive-compatible mechanism achieves robust implementation. Assigning the prize as a function of best applications and worst references achieves dominant strategy implementation for all networks and full implementation for the complete network and a class of networks if agents are partially honest.

Keywords: network, mechanism design, peer mechanism, prize allocation, implementation, evidence, partial honesty

JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83, D85

Suggested Citation

Baumann, Leonie, Robust implementation with peer mechanisms and evidence (November 24, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2873888 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2873888

Leonie Baumann (Contact Author)

McGill University - Department of Economics ( email )

855 Sherbrooke Street West
Montreal, QC H3A 2T7
CANADA

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