The Banking Union and National Authorities Two Years Down the Line – Some Observations from Germany

21 Pages Posted: 25 Nov 2016

See all articles by Jens-Hinrich Binder

Jens-Hinrich Binder

Eberhard-Karls-University - Faculty of Law; London School of Economics - Law School; EUSFIL Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence

Date Written: November 22, 2016

Abstract

With the institutional setting for the Banking Union having been established and become fully operational, market participants, supervisory staff, and academics are gradually getting to terms with the reality of the new two-tier system of supervisory and resolution authorities within the Eurozone. Drawing from media coverage, input from practitioners and the on-going academic debate, the present article seeks to present an – inevitably provisional – assessment of the new regime from a German perspective. While regulatees and their advisers within the country appear to have got used to the new reality, the paper also identifies a number of residual concerns, some of which are attributable to the specific characteristics of the German financial sector, others indicative of broader problems.

Keywords: Banking Union, Single Supervisory Mechanism, Single Resolution Mechanism, German Banking Sector

JEL Classification: G15, G21, G28, K22, K23

Suggested Citation

Binder, Jens-Hinrich, The Banking Union and National Authorities Two Years Down the Line – Some Observations from Germany (November 22, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2874313 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2874313

Jens-Hinrich Binder (Contact Author)

Eberhard-Karls-University - Faculty of Law ( email )

Geschwister-Scholl-Platz
Tuebingen, 72074
Germany
++49-(0)-7071-29-76119 (Phone)
++49-(0)-7071-29-35283 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.jura.uni-tuebingen.de/professoren_und_dozenten/binder

London School of Economics - Law School ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

EUSFIL Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence ( email )

Italy

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