Level-k models and overspending in contests

19 Pages Posted: 27 Nov 2016 Last revised: 20 Apr 2022

See all articles by Marco Serena

Marco Serena

Colegio Universitario de Estudios Financieros CUNEF

Malin Arve

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)

Date Written: October 9, 2017

Abstract

The experimental evidence on contests often reports significant overspending of subjects as opposed to the Nash equilibrium. We complement the existing explanations by providing a theoretical rationale for overspending which is based on the level-k model.

Keywords: Contest, Level-k reasoning

JEL Classification: C72, D72

Suggested Citation

Serena, Marco and Arve, Malin, Level-k models and overspending in contests (October 9, 2017). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-09, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2874894 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2874894

Marco Serena (Contact Author)

Colegio Universitario de Estudios Financieros CUNEF ( email )

Calle de Leonardo Prieto Castro, 2
Madrid, 28040
Spain

Malin Arve

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) ( email )

Helleveien 30
Bergen, NO-5045
Norway

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