Explaining Self-Interested Behavior of Public-Spirited Policymakers

Public Administration Review, Forthcoming

Hebrew University of Jerusalem Legal Research Paper No. 17-8

24 Pages Posted: 29 Nov 2016 Last revised: 19 Jun 2017

See all articles by Eyal Zamir

Eyal Zamir

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law

Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan

Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Political Science Department

Date Written: November 28, 2016

Abstract

Public choice theory (PCT) has had a powerful influence on political science and, to a lesser extent, on public administration. Based on the premise that public officials are rational maximizers of their own utility, PCT has a quite successful record of correctly predicting governmental decisions and policies. This success is puzzling, given behavioral findings that show that officials do not necessarily seek to maximize their own utility. Drawing on recent advances in behavioral ethics (BE), this article offers a new behavioral foundation for PCT’s predictions, by delineating the psychological processes that lead well-intentioned people to violate moral and social norms. It reviews the relevant findings of BE, analyzes their theoretical and policy implications for officials’ decision-making, and sets an agenda for future research.

Keywords: Public choice theory, agency theory, self-interest, behavioral ethics, behavioral law and economics, conflict of interests, policy, public interests

JEL Classification: D03, D72, D73, D78, H00, H83, K20, L51

Suggested Citation

Zamir, Eyal and Sulitzeanu-Kenan, Raanan, Explaining Self-Interested Behavior of Public-Spirited Policymakers (November 28, 2016). Public Administration Review, Forthcoming, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Legal Research Paper No. 17-8, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2876437 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2876437

Eyal Zamir (Contact Author)

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law ( email )

Mount Scopus
Mount Scopus, IL 91905
Israel
+972 2 582 3845 (Phone)
+972 2 582 9002 (Fax)

Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan

Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Political Science Department ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem
Israel

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