Subsidiarity as a Limit to the Exercise of EU Competences

Abstract

This article examines how subsidiarity can limit the exercise of EU competence. It suggests that the problems of reconstructing subsidiarity cannot be seen in isolation from the issue of judicial review. In a substantive sense it contends that subsidiarity can be reconceptualised as a principle that challenges the internal market justification for exercise of Union competences. It argues for a narrow understanding of subsidiarity, suggesting the EU legislator to demonstrate the risk or the existence of a transnational market failure or a transnational interest in order to substantiate EU harmonization. From the perspective of judicial enforcement the key argument is to change the focus from ‘substantive review’ to ‘procedural review’ of subsidiarity in order to meet institutional concerns. The proposed standard of review suggests that the EU legislator must offer ‘adequate reasoning’ and ‘relevant evidence’ to maintain that EU legislation conforms to the subsidiarity principle.

Keywords: Subsidiarity, EU competences, judicial review, internal market