Routine Corruption in Russia During the Reigns of Catherine II and Alexander I

Posted: 1 Dec 2016 Last revised: 27 Sep 2017

See all articles by Elena Korchmina

Elena Korchmina

Independent; National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow)

Igor Fedyukin

National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow)

Date Written: November 30, 2016

Abstract

This articles uses the account records books from a variety of Golitsyn estates in the late eighteenth- early ninetieth century to assess the level of "routine corruption" in Imperial Russia. The data from these books allows us to identify individual cases of unofficial payments made by the estates and by peasant commune to the district-level officials; to delimit key types of payment situations; and to calculate the overall volumes of payments. The resulting numbers are compared to the overall volume of obligations carried by the serfs to the state and toothier landlords. Our conclusion is that while the routine unofficial payments were ubiquitous and accompanied any interaction with the state, by the time of Catherine II's reign their volume l was quite low and did not put significant burden on the population. Rather, officials made fortunes by extracting unofficial payments in more targeted ways.

Keywords: Russia, corruption, bureaucracy, peasants, Golitsyns, gift-giving

JEL Classification: Z

Suggested Citation

Korchmina, Elena and Korchmina, Elena and Fedyukin, Igor, Routine Corruption in Russia During the Reigns of Catherine II and Alexander I (November 30, 2016). Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 136/HUM/2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2877760 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2877760

Elena Korchmina

Independent ( email )

National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow) ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Igor Fedyukin (Contact Author)

National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow) ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

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