Does Share Issue Privatisation Necessarily Boost Firm Performance? New Evidence from China’s NTS Reform

55 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 2016 Last revised: 11 Jan 2020

See all articles by Christos Mavrovitis (Mavis)

Christos Mavrovitis (Mavis)

University of Surrey - Surrey Business School

Sarmistha Pal

University of Surrey; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Nan Xiong

Durham University

Date Written: January 9, 2020

Abstract

Using China’s Non-tradeable Share (NTS) reform as a natural experiment and exploiting its staggered adoption, we assess the impact of share privatisation on corporate performance and earnings management. 2005 NTS reform required all listed firms with NTS to adopt it by 2006 though the process of NTS conversion went on till 2009. Earnings management went down; but market or accounting performance of treated firms (with NTS) did not improve because its valuation multiple failed to improve. We document that the latter is attributed to persistent government control through legal persons shares, tunnelling as well as related party transactions.

Keywords: Non-tradable shares reform; Lock-up period and staggered implementation; Firm performance; Earnings management; Corporate entrenchment; China

JEL Classification: G31; G38; C36; L33

Suggested Citation

Mavrovitis (Mavis), Christos and Pal, Sarmistha and Xiong, Nan, Does Share Issue Privatisation Necessarily Boost Firm Performance? New Evidence from China’s NTS Reform (January 9, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2880145 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2880145

Christos Mavrovitis (Mavis)

University of Surrey - Surrey Business School ( email )

Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.surrey.ac.uk/people/christos-p-mavis

Sarmistha Pal (Contact Author)

University of Surrey ( email )

Stag Hill
Guildford, England GU2 7XH
United Kingdom
01483 683995 (Phone)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Nan Xiong

Durham University ( email )

Durham, DH1 3LE
Great Britain

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