The Limitations of International Auditing: The Case of the Norway-Guyana REDD Agreement

Abstract

This chapter focuses on the practices of international auditing firms sponsored directly or indirectly by the Government of Norway to verify Guyana’s compliance with indicators intended, inter alia, to improve forest governance as part of a global Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) strategy. I argue that by dealing principally with the Executive arm of the Guyana Government, and not including the legislative arm (Parliament), the Norwegian Government defeated its own declared intention to advance governance in REDD. I show that both governments have a vested interest in positive audit reports and appear to have used their power accordingly to reward or dismiss auditors. I argue that the progressive watering down of the compliance indicators makes such weakly monitored REDD schemes ineffective as one mechanism for slowing global warming. I recommend that credible auditing should be carried out by mixed teams of global and local auditors with strong terms of reference, recruited independently of the client governments, and required to report back in culturally appropriate language to key affected constituency groups.

Keywords: Guyana, Norway, REDD, audit firms, forests, Indigenous Peoples