Screening for Patent Quality

68 Pages Posted: 12 Dec 2016 Last revised: 19 Mar 2018

See all articles by Mark A. Schankerman

Mark A. Schankerman

London School of Economics and Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Florian Schuett

KU Leuven - Department of Economics; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management

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Date Written: December 2016

Abstract

To study how governments can improve the quality of patent screening, we develop an integrative framework incorporating four main policy instruments: patent office examination, pre- and post-grant fees, and challenges in the courts. We show that examination and pre grant fees are complementary, and that pre-grant fees screen more effectively than post-grant fees. Simulations of the model, calibrated on U.S. patent and litigation data, indicate that patenting is socially excessive and the patent office does not effectively weed out low quality applications. We use the calibrated model to quantify the welfare effects of various counterfactual policy reforms.

Keywords: courts, innovation, litigation, patent fees, patents, screening

JEL Classification: D82, K41, L24, O31, O34, O38

Suggested Citation

Schankerman, Mark A. and Schuett, Florian, Screening for Patent Quality (December 2016). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11688, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2884071

Mark A. Schankerman (Contact Author)

London School of Economics and Political Science ( email )

Houghton Street
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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
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Florian Schuett

KU Leuven - Department of Economics ( email )

Leuven
Belgium

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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