Understanding Standing: Permission to Deflect Reasons

37 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2016 Last revised: 29 Jun 2017

See all articles by Ori J. Herstein

Ori J. Herstein

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Faculty of Law; King's College London - Dickson Poon School of Law

Date Written: December 17, 2016

Abstract

Standing is a peculiar norm, allowing for deflecting – that is rejecting offhand and without deliberation – interventions such as directives. Directives are speech acts that aim to give directive-reasons, which are reason to do as the directive directs because of the directive. Standing norms, therefore, provide for deflecting directives regardless of validity (i.e., regardless of whether or not a directive succeeds in giving a directive-reason) or the normative weight of the rejected directive. The logic of the normativity of standing is, therefore, not the logic of invalidating directives or of competing with directive-reasons but of ‘exclusionary permission’. That is, standing norms provide for permission to exclude from practical deliberation directive-reasons if given without the requisite standing, regardless of their normative weight. As such, standing is a type of second-order norm.

Numerous everyday practices involve the deflection of directives, such as pervasive practices of deflecting hypocritical and officious directives. Of various possible models, the one that best captures the normative structure of these practices of deflection is the standing model. Accordingly, the normativity of standing is pervasive in our everyday practices. Establishing that standing, although a neglected philosophical idea, is a significant and independent normative concept.

Keywords: Standing, Authority, Exclusionary Reasons

Suggested Citation

Herstein, Ori J., Understanding Standing: Permission to Deflect Reasons (December 17, 2016). Philosophical Studies (Forthcoming), Hebrew University of Jerusalem Legal Research Paper No. 17-10, King's College London Law School Research Paper No. 17-26, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2886788

Ori J. Herstein (Contact Author)

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Faculty of Law ( email )

Mt. Scopus
Jerusalem, 91905
Israel

HOME PAGE: http://law.huji.ac.il/eng/segel.asp?staff_id=190&cat=441

King's College London - Dickson Poon School of Law ( email )

Somerset House East Wing
Strand
London, WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/law/people/visiting/oherstein.aspx

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