Investing in Conflict Management
UC-Irvine, Economics Working Paper No. 00-01-17
19 Pages Posted: 13 Nov 2001
Date Written: December 2000
Abstract
Achieving peace and building the institutions that will make it last require much time and effort on the part of adversaries. While making this effort, the likelihood of peace is uncertain and preparations for conflict are on-going. We examine a setting that takes such considerations into account.
Adversaries divide their resources between "guns," "butter," and investments in conflict management. Even when all adversaries undertake sizable investments in conflict management, peace is uncertain. We find that larger initial wealth increases the likelihood of peace, whereas the number of adversaries can have widely different effects. A larger number of adversaries in cases of international conflict tends to increase the likelihood of peace, but it has the opposite effect in cases of domestic conflict.
Keywords: conflict, institution, war, fragmentation
JEL Classification: D74, N4
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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