Negotiating Complex Contracts

Posted: 12 Jul 2006

See all articles by Mark Klein

Mark Klein

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Peyman Faratin

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Hiroki Sayama

New England Complex Systems Institute

Yaneer Bar-Yam

New England Complex Systems Institute

Date Written: October 2001

Abstract

Work to date on computational models of negotiation has focused almost exclusively on defining contracts consisting of one or a few independent issues, linear utility functions, and tractable contract spaces. Many real-world contracts, by contrast, are much more complex, consisting of multiple interdependent issues, nonlinear utility functions, and intractably large contract spaces. This paper describes a simulated annealing based approach appropriate for negotiating such complex contracts, evaluates its efficacy, and suggests some potentially promising avenues for defining more efficient algorithms for negotiating complex contracts.

Suggested Citation

Klein, Mark and Faratin, Peyman and Sayama, Hiroki and Bar-Yam, Yaneer, Negotiating Complex Contracts (October 2001). MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4196-01, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=290147 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.290147

Mark Klein (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://cci.mit.edu/klein/

Peyman Faratin

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

100 Main Street
E62-416
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

Hiroki Sayama

New England Complex Systems Institute ( email )

24 Mt. Auburn St.
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Yaneer Bar-Yam

New England Complex Systems Institute ( email )

24 Mt. Auburn St.
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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