Too Much from Too Little: A Critique of Gerald Gaus's Libertarian Neutralism
50 Pages Posted: 24 Jan 2017
Date Written: January 17, 2017
Abstract
Gerald Gaus is the pre-eminent contemporary exponent of the libertarian strand of anti-perfectionism. His relevant writings over three decades include some powerful and lengthy tomes as well as many articles, but I will concentrate here on certain lines of reasoning in two quite recent essays of his. In those essays, Gaus endeavors to establish that his variety of neutralism -- with its distinctively libertarian tenor -- can be derived from some premises that are compelling and therefore largely uncontroversial.
This article will contest some aspects of his derivation and will particularly contest his suggestion that his premises are suitably uncontroversial as the bases for a doctrine of liberal neutralism. Both his neutralism and his libertarianism will come under challenge here. Because Gaus has produced such a highly impressive body of work, my engagement with his sophisticated reflections can signal the need for some departures from neutralism in its current forms.
Keywords: Gerald Gaus, libertarianism, neutralism, perfectionism, Rawlsianism, liberalism, moral justification
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