Monetary Conformation of Corporate Governmentality IV: International Treaties (Conclusion)

Int. J. Critical Accounting, Vol. 8, Nos. 5/6, 2016

5 Pages Posted: 17 Feb 2017

See all articles by Eduardo Rivera Vicencio

Eduardo Rivera Vicencio

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Faculty of Economics and Business Studies

Omar Garcia

University of Seville

Jose Romero Bravo

University of Granada

Date Written: February 13, 2017

Abstract

This paper describes the formation of international treaties as an integral part of the relationships that develop in the monetary system. In these relationships of the monetary system there are relationships between States, which are relationships between big companies operating from certain States with key global currencies and with others normally economically weaker States and/or dependent on the strongest currencies in the monetary system. This conformation of the relationships of the monetary system is framed within the Theory of Corporate Governmentality or the theory of government of large corporations, characterised by the concentration of wealth and ownership of income present and future, with backed debt-money generated by the financial system, which has supported this concentration of wealth. This is how international treaties are part of the elements of submission and domination by big companies to certain States or groups of States that end up imposing certain internal changes, with significant loss of sovereignty and with the complicity of economic powers and local politicians in these States, plus the complicity of international organisations, also subject to this corporate governmentality.

Suggested Citation

Rivera Vicencio, Eduardo and Garcia, Omar and Romero Bravo, Jose, Monetary Conformation of Corporate Governmentality IV: International Treaties (Conclusion) (February 13, 2017). Int. J. Critical Accounting, Vol. 8, Nos. 5/6, 2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2916089

Eduardo Rivera Vicencio (Contact Author)

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Faculty of Economics and Business Studies ( email )

Campus Bellaterra
Barcelona, 08193
Spain

Omar Garcia

University of Seville ( email )

Avda. del Cid s/n
Sevilla, Sevilla 41004
Spain

Jose Romero Bravo

University of Granada ( email )

C/Rector López Argueta S/N
Granada, Granada 18071
Spain

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